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PARENTS, JUDGES, AND A MINOR'S
ABORTION DECISION: THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION
AND THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVE
by
WILLIAM GREEN* t
I. INTRODUCTION
O VER ONE AND A HALF MILLION women obtain legal abortions every year.'
Approximately one-third are women under the age of eighteen.2 The
seminal United States Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade3 did not discuss
what rights parents might have to participate in their minor child's decision
to have an abortion. After Roe, legislatures in several states adopted statutes
requiring parental consent for the performance of a minor's abortion. Some
states provided minors who did not want to seek parental consent with the alter-
native of judicial consent. Other states required a physician to notify a minor's
parents before he performed the abortion. The Supreme Court has examined
these statutes on three occasions without clearly resolving the issue of parental
consent. This past term when the Court once again confronted the issue in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.4 and Planned Parent-
hood v. Ashcroft,' it was able to provide support for adult third party
participation.
This article will examine the Supreme Court's modification of Roe v. Wade
to permit third party participation in a minor's abortion decision-making: how
it originated, what direction it has taken and at whose initiative, and what issues
remain. This article will argue that the Court's difficulty in resolving this issue
resulted from the justices' disagreement over what recognition, if any, should
be given to the minor-related interests that states have asserted to support third
party involvement. This article will also argue that the Court's eventual ability
to reach agreement was due primarily to the policy leadership of Justice Powell.
Part I will set out a framework for the analysis of third party participation.
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky; B.A., Kent State University (1963);
M.A., Kent State University (1%7); Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo (1977).
tl acknowledge the advice of Professors John Batt and Robert Schwemm, College of Law, University
of Kentucky, in the preparation of this article.
'In 1980, there were 1,533,000 legal abortions in the United States. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't.
of Commerce. STATISTICAL AasTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982-83, 68 (1982).
'In 1980, 461,000 women under nineteen received legal abortions in the United States. Id.
1410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983).
'103 S.Ct. 2517 (1983).
1
Green: Abortion
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
This framework is based on five third party models and three judicial rationales
for the analysis of statutes based on those models. This framework will then
be used to evaluate the Court's initial response in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,6 Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II),' and H. L. v. Matheson.8 Part II will
then employ the framework to examine the Akron Center and Ashcroft cases.
It will describe the third party provisions in an Akron ordinance and a Missouri
statute and then analyze the judicial response to those laws. Part III will draw
some conclusions regarding the Court's decisions and then discuss what third
party issues remain to be decided.
I. THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION IN A MINOR'S ABORTION DECISION
The Supreme Court's examination of state legislation authorizing third
party participation has been framed by its decision in Roe v. Wade. In that
case the Court established a bilateral participation model that involved the
woman and her physician. 9 State involvement was severely restricted, because
Roe required that any regulation of a woman's abortion decision had to be
justified by a compelling state interest in either maternal health or fetal life.10
A major issue since Roe has been whether its bilateral model should be altered
to permit other adult participants to become involved in a minor woman's abor-
tion decision.
A. Trilateral Participation Models
A central issue in the controversy over third party participation has been
the competence of a minor woman to make an informed decision. State abor-
tion legislation enacted after Roe generally assumed that a minor was not com-
petent to make an informed decision in consultation with her physician. These
statutes have prohibited a physician from performing an abortion on a minor
unless an adult third party - a parent or a judge - has been involved in the
minor's decision-making. These third party participation provisions, justified
by an asserted state interest in protecting children, parental authority, and the
family relationship, have required two types of trilateral participation - con-
sent and notice - illustrated in Figure 1 and described below.
Parental consent statues commonly impose on the minor woman the duty
to obtain parental or judicial consent, which the physician must have before
he performs the abortion. These statutes are based on three model provisions
which differ basically in the extent of participation by the two principal third
parties i.e., parents and judges. Model I consent provisions (A-B-D) recognize
a strong parental role with their requirement of exclusive parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision. These provisions contemplate that a minor
6428 U.S. 52 (1976).
'443 U.S. 622 (1979).
'450 U.S. 398 (1981).
'410 U.S. at 153.
1Id. at 162-64.
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FIGURE 1
ABORTION PARTICIPATION MODELS
C - Judge
- Physician
Woman -
Note:
Solid lines with arrows indicate third party consent routes.
Broken lines with arrows indicate third party notice routes.
A-D is the Roe bilateral model.
will have notified and consulted with her parents, because they commonly re-
quire the minor to obtain written parental consent before the abortion is
performed." Model II and III consent provisions grant the minor a judicial
alternative to exclusive parental participation in the abortion decision. Model
II consent provisions (A-B-D then A-C-D) require the minor to initially re-
quest her parents' consent and then, if they refuse, to petition a court for an
order that would permit her to have an abortion.'2 Model III consent provi-
sions (A-B-D or A-C-D) substitute the "parents first" requirement of Model
II with a "judges first" option. If the minor does not want to ask for her parents'
consent she may petition a state court to order the physician to perform the
abortion.' 3 Thus, Model II and III provisions increasingly weaken the exclusive
parental role, but they do not necessarily eliminate parental involvement.
"Act of June 14, 1974, § 3(4), 1974 Mo. Laws 809.
"See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12S (West 1983).
"See, e.g., AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870.05(B) (1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
B - Parent
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Parental notice statutes commonly require notification of and consulta-
tion with the minor's parents. These statutes are based on two model provi-
sions. Judicial notice provisions (C-B) impose on a court the duty to notify
the parents prior to the abortion hearing and may provide them with the oppor-
tunity for consultation and participation prior to the judge's decision on their
minor daughter's petition.'" Physician notice provisions (D-B) impose on the
doctor a similar notice duty before he performs an abortion on a minor child. 5
State abortion statutes contain both parental consent and notice provi-
sions. Model II and III provisions which contain a judicial consent alternative
may be joined with a judicial and/or physician notice provision. When they
are joined, the purpose is to assure that if the minor chooses the judicial alter-
native her parents will have the opportunity to become involved before a court
issues its order and the physician performs the abortion. The extent to which
parents may become involved depends upon two characteristics of notice pro-
visions: their scope and depth. First, some provisions limit notification to the
parents of immature and dependent minors, while others require that all parents
be notified.' Second, some provisions require parental notification, if possi-
ble, while others contain a formal notice requirement. 7 Judicial notice statutes
have even gone so far as to permit parents to consult with the child and the
judge, grant parents the right to participate in the hearing and appeal, and
provide indigent parents with court-appointed counsel. 8 These notice provi-
sions raise several questions: Are any of them acceptable and, if so, under what
circumstances, or do they intrude upon the confidentiality of the judicial alter-
native or of the participants in the Roe bilateral model?
B. Judicial Response
How has the Supreme Court responded to parental consent and notice
statutes based on these trilateral participation models? The Court has used a
middle level scrutiny test: Does the state have important or significant minor-
related interests and, if it does, do its regulations of a minor's abortion serve
those governmental interests? 19 Using this test to explain the decisions in parental
consent and notice cases is difficult, because the justices have employed it to
justify very different views about third party participation. 0 What can explain
the Court's difficulty with the issue of a minor's abortion decision-making and
"See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(2),(3),(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1978).
"See, e.g., AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870.05(A) (1975).
6Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1953) with Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978)
and AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870.05(A) (1975).
17Id.
"Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(3),(6) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
"1428 U.S. at 74-75 (1976).
"The justices agree that state regulation of a minor's abortion will be evaluated by whether such regulation
advances significant state interests. There is no consensus, however, on whether such interests can serve
as the basis for regulation of a minor's abortion decision-making. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying
text.
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how it has agreed to modify the Roe bilateral model? This article will argue
that the Court's decisional behavior can be explained as the interaction of three
different rationales on which the justices have relied to answer the question
of what recognition, if any, should be given to the interests states have ad-
vanced to justify third party participation in a minor's abortion decision-making.
The Pro-Woman Rationale opposes any modification of the Roe bilateral
model. It acknowledges that states have significant minor-related interests, but
maintains that state regulation of a minor's abortion based on any of the
trilateral models cannot serve those state interests. Those models, according
to this rationale, are based on an idealistic view of parent-child relations which
permits third-party self-interested action to impermissibly burden the woman's
Roe-granted privacy right.2 '
The Pro-State Rationale accepts modifications of the Roe bilateral model
reasonably necessary to further significant minor-related interests. It is willing
to indulge the traditional assumptions about children and parents on which
a state legislative action is based; i.e., that minors are presumptively incapable
of informed consent and that parents will act in their child's best interests most
of the time. As a result, this rationale claims that regulations requiring third
party involvement will assist the minor in exercising her Roe-granted right.22
The Accommodation Rationale accepts modification of the Roe bilateral
model. It agrees that states have significant minor-related interests, but it will
not permit those interests to be implemented in a blanket fashion. Instead, this
rationale requires the examination of the assumptions on which a legislature's
judgment has been made and then requires that if a state wishes to regulate
a minor's abortion decision-making then it must establish standards for third
party participation which protect a minor's privacy right while respecting the
state's minor-related interests.23
How has the use of these three rationales explained judicial behavior in
third party participation cases? The Court's initial response in Danforth, Bellotti
II, and Matheson will be examined below.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth
State abortion laws containing third party consent requirements for minors
"See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2526-32 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 425-54 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 652-56
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-79 (1976) (Blackmun,
J., plurality opinion).
"See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 420-25 (Stevens, J., concurring); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 656-57 (White, J.,
dissenting); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 94-95 (White, J., dissenting) and 101-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"See Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2497-99 (1983); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 399-413 (Burger, C.J., plurality
opinion) and 413-25 (Powell, J., concurring); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 624-51 (Powell, J., plurality opinion);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 90-92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Summer, 19831 ABORTION
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were first examined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.2"
The Missouri statute, typical of Model I consent provisions enacted immediately
after Roe, provided that where the pregnant woman was unmarried and under
eighteen the written consent of a parent was required . 2 The Court found that
the exclusive parental consent provision was unconstitutional, but its decision
revealed that the Court was closely divided over the applicability of the Roe
bilateral model to a minor's abortion decision-making.
Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Blackmun, relying upon the
Pro-Woman Rationale, found that the parental consent provision was
unacceptable because it provided a third party with "an absolute and possibly
arbitrary veto," which overrode the minor's privacy right without furthering
the state interests in safeguarding the family and enhancing parental authority
and control. 6 It was unlikely, he asserted, "that such veto power will enhance
parental authority or control where the minor and the non-consenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and where the very existence of the pregnancy
already has fractured the family structure."" Justice Stewart, in a concurrence
joined by Justice Powell, believed that the state could encourage a minor to
seek parental assistance, but agreed with Justice Blackmun that Missouri's paren-
tal consent statute was invalid because it imposed "an absolute limitation on
the minor's right to obtain an abortion."
2
1
8
Justices White and Stevens, writing separately in dissent, analyzed the
Missouri parental consent requirement using a Pro-State Rationale. Justice
Steven's dissent argued that the state had an interest in the welfare of children
and the power to protect a minor against an incorrect abortion decision, because
the most significant consequences of an abortion were non-medical.2 9 It was
reasonable, he said, for a state legislature to assume that parents would be in-
terested in their child's welfare and to conclude that a parental consent require-
ment was an appropriate means to foster the child's welfare and to assist the
child in making a correct decision.3 Justice White, joined in a brief dissent
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, agreed that Missouri's paren-
tal consent provision was "the traditional way by which States have sought
to protect children from their own immature and improvident decisions." 3
In sum, Danforth forbade consent provisions which required written paren-
tal consent for an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion. However, it left
2428 U.S. 52 (1976).
"Act of June 14, 1974, § 3(4), 1974 Mo. Laws 809.
16428 U.S. at 75.
27Id.
"Id. at 90.
"Id. at 103.
"Id. at 104.
"Id. at 95.
[Vol. 17:1
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undecided whether any third party participation was permissible. Danforth was
a potentially far-reaching decision. In overturning the Missouri parental con-
sent provision, Justice Blackmun declared that a state did not have the power
to give any third party an absolute veto.32 At the same time, Danforth also
suggested that future conflict might well focus on an Accommodation Rationale.
If some form of third party participation in a minor's abortion decision were
permissible, two questions would remain. First, could a state distinguish be-
tween minors on the basis of their maturity and independence in determining
whether they could give effective consent? Justice Blackmun emphasized that
the holding in Danforth did "not suggest that every minor, regardless of age
or maturity, may give effective consent to the termination of her pregnancy." 33
Second, could a state require all minors, irrespective of their maturity, to ob-
tain approval for their abortions from an adult participant? In his concurrence,
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, suggested for the first time that a
third party consent provision would be constitutionally acceptable if it includ-
ed "a provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases, but
providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the
parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature
enough to give an informed consent without parental concurrence or that an
abortion in any event is in the minor's best interest." 3" These unanswered ques-
tions confronted the Court once again when it examined a Model II consent
statute.
2. Bellotti v. Baird
A Massachusetts abortion statute" contained a Model II consent provi-
sion and a blanket judicial notice requirement, both of which were the subject
of extended litigation. The statute was first considered in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti I)36 where the Supreme Court vacated the district court decision because
the state supreme court had not been given the opportunity to authoritatively
construe the statue in order to "avoid in whole or part the necessity for federal
constitutional adjudication.. . . "I After the statute was construed on remand,
the district court once again declared it unconstitutional. On direct appeal in
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), the Supreme Court affirmed 8-1, but was unable
to agree on the statute's constitutional defect.3 Once again the Court was divided
over the applicability of the Roe bilateral model to a woman's abortion decision-
making.
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined
321d. at 74.
"Id. at 75.
"Id. at 90-91.
"1MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12S (West 1983).
36428 U.S. 132 (1976).
"Id. at 147 (quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)).
3 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. To analyze the
Massachusetts statute, Justice Powell proposed a third party provision based
on the Accommodation Rationale. His proposal contained a Model III provi-
sion. It would permit a state to require a minor to seek adult consent, but would
require the state to provide her with a choice which included a "courts first"
option. "[E]very minor must have the opportunity - if she so desires - to
go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents."3 9
If the minor sought court approval, three standards would limit judicial
discretion: individuality, confidentiality, and expeditiousness. First, a judge's
discretion would be limited by the individual minor's status. Justice Powell
stated that the statute must provide the minor with the opportunity to show
either (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her
abortion decision in consultation with her physician independently of her
parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision in-
dependently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests." ° If the minor
satisfied the court of her maturity, the court had to authorize her abortion."'
If, however, she failed to satisfy the court of her maturity, then the court's
discretion was limited to a determination of whether an abortion would be in
her best interests."2 Second, the statute had to limit judicial discretion and paren-
tal involvement by tailoring the confidentiality of the judicial proceeding to
the individual minor's status. Here, Justice Powell proposed a limited judicial
notice provision. If a court decided a minor was mature then it had no discre-
tion, but had to authorize her to act without parental involvement."3 In mak-
ing a decision about an immature minor's best interests, a court would, however,
have the discretion to authorize her abortion without parental involvement,
"deny the abortion.., in the absence of parental consultation or... defer
the decision until there is parental consultation in which the court may
participate."" Third, the statute had to assure that "a resolution of the issue
and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and suffi-
cient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for the abortion to be
obtained."'
Applying his third party proposal, Justice Powell condemned the statute
because it did not provide the minor with an option, but instead required parental
denial first and then permitted the minor to petition a court. 6 The statute's
judicial alternative also contained two defects. First, it gave a court unconfin-
"Id. at 647.
"d. at 643-44.
"'Id. at 647.
"1d. at 647-48.
"Id. at 647.
"4Id. at 648.
"Id. at 644.
"d. at 647.
[Vol. 17:1
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ed discretion to determine the best interests of the minor irrespective of her
maturity.47 Second, it intruded indiscriminately upon the confidentiality of
minors, because it contained a judicial notice provision which required a court
to notify and consult with all parents."' Justice Powell did, however, conclude
that the statute could be construed to assure a prompt judicial decision."
Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, concurred on narrow grounds. Justice Stevens rejected Justice
Powell's third party proposal as an advisory opinion. 5 0 The Danforth bilateral
model governed a minor's abortion decision-making; i.e., a state could not
"give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary veto over the decision
of the physician and his patient . . . ."I' Applying Danforth, Justice Stevens
found the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional because it imposed a double
veto: first parental and then judicial.52 The judicial alternative was objectionable
for two reasons. First, the resort to the judicial process "would impose a burden
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child
by the need to obtain the consent of a parent."II Second, the statute afforded
the judge a veto, because his decision would be based on a best interests stan-
dard. "That standard provides little real guidance to the judge, and his deci-
sion must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores whose en-
forcement upon the minor - particularly when contrary to her own informed
and reasonable decision - is fundamentally at odds with [her] privacy
interests . . . ."" Justice Stevens was, however, unwilling to say whether a
third party provision which met his criticisms of the Massachusetts statute would
be acceptable. Unlike Justice Powell, he refused to address "the constitutionality
of an abortion statute that Massachusetts had not enacted .. . 5
In sum, any Model II consent provision or a blanket judicial notice pro-
vision was unconstitutional on the basis of either the Accommodation or the
Pro-Woman Rationale as set forth in Bellotti II's plurality opinions. However,
Bellotti II's failure to provide an authoritative statement of judicial participa-
tion left in doubt the Court's view of Model III and judicial notice provisions
enacted prior to the Court's decision. Justice Stevens along with Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmum were completely unsympathetic to adult
third party participation provisions. The Powell plurality (Justices Powell,
Stewart, Burger, and Rehnquist) just as strongly supported an adult partici-
pant, but granted the minor the discretion to choose and required that the
"'Id. at 651.
,SId.
"Id. at 644-45.
"Id. at 656 n.4.
"Id. at 654.
"Id.
"Id. at 655.
"Id. at 655-56.
"Id. at 656.
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judicial alternative be structured so as to maximize the values of individuality,
confidentiality, and expedition. Justice White's disagreement with both of these
plurality views confused the matter even further. In his dissent, he relied on
a Pro-State Rationale to approve the Massachusetts Model II consent provi-
sion and its blanket judicial notice provision. He believed that a state could
require that all parents receive notice and have the opportunity to participate
in a judicial hearing to determine the minor's best interests.56 The effect of
these divergent rationales on the Court's response to Model III consent provi-
sions and judicial notice requirements would, however, have to await the out-
come of the Court's examination of physician notice provisions.
3. H.L. v. Matheson
State abortion statutes containing requirements that a physician notify the
minor's parents were first examined by the Court in H.L. v. Matheson. I At
issue was a Utah statute which required a physician to "notify, if possible,
the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be per-
formed, if she is a minor."'" The Court decided 6-3 that the parental notice
provision as applied to an immature, dependent minor was constitutional, but
once again it remained divided over the involvement of third parties in a minor's
abortion decision.
Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion
joined only by Justices White and Rehnquist. The Chief Justice avoided the
broad question decided by the Utah Supreme Court - whether the physician
notice provision applied to all minors - by denying that the minor appellant
possessed standing to challenge the applicability of the statute to mature and
emancipated minors." As a consequence, he addressed only the narrow issue
presented by the appellant's factual situation: Whether the statute required the
physician to give prior notice to the parents of an immature, dependent minor. 60
The Chief Justice answered in terms of the Accommodation Rationale: Dan-
forth held that a blanket parental consent provision (Model I) provided parents
with unreviewable veto power, but the mere requirement of parental notice
limited to immature and dependent minors did not impose the same undue
burden.61 As applied to these minors, the Chief Justice concluded, such a pro-
vision served important state interests in protecting children, promoting family
integrity, and improving a physician's judgment. 62
16Id. at 656-67.
"1450 U.S. 398 (1981).
"UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1953).
9450 U.S. at 405-06 (1981).
"Id. at 407.
"Id. at 409.
"Id. at 411-12.
[Vol. 17:1
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Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in the judgment that the Utah statute
did not burden the minor woman's abortion right, but disagreed with one
another over the breadth of the notice requirement. Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Stewart, argued that a blanket physician notice requirement was at odds
with his Bellotti II opinion unless it provided the mature or "best interests"
minor with an independent decision-maker. 63 He wrote separately to make it
clear that he subscribed to Chief Justice Burger's application of the Accom-
modation Rationale as long a- notice was limited to immature and dependent
minors and that the Court's decision leit open "the question [as to] whether
... [the statute] burdens the right of a mature minor or a minor whose best
interests would not be served by parental notification." 6
Justice Stevens, concurring alone, disagreed. He believed that the state's
interests were sufficient to support a notification requirement for all minors.
Using a Pro-State Rationale, Justice Stevens argued, as he had in Danforth,
that the state had the power to assure that a minor made a correct decision
and a parental notification requirement was an appropriate means to assure
that outcome. 65 The rationale of this legislative choice, Justice Stevens
further argued, was not undercut by the fact that some minors may not be
mature or emancipated or by "[t]he possibility that some parents will not react
with compassion and understanding ... [or] will incorrectly advise [their
child] . . ,.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in dissent,
argued that the physician notice requirement was inconsistent with the Pro-
Woman Rationale, because it infringed on the minor's privacy right while failing
to serve any of the asserted significant state interests. The notice provisions
also intruded upon the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship 67 and
placed an undue burden on a women's decision functionally equivalent to that
imposed by consent requirements. 68 Moreover, the provisions were inconsis-
tent with Bellotti II's rejection of a state statute which had authorized "judicial
review of a minor's abortion decision ... precisely because a parent notified
of the court action might interfere." 69
In sum, Matheson held that a physician notice provision was constitutional
if it were limited to immature and dependent minors. This decision is notable
for two reasons. It was the first time that the Court upheld a state regulation
of a minor's abortion decision that altered the Roe bilateral model. It was also
the first time that the Court was able to reach rough agreement on a common
6Id. at 420.
"Id. at 414.
6Id. at 423.
6Id. at 424.
6Id. at 437-38.
"Id. at 438.
69Id. at 440 n.27.
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rationale: the Accommodation Rationale. Rough agreement occurred because
only four justices can be said to have firmly supported the Accommodation
Rational - Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Powell, and Stewart. They composed
the Powell plurality that had used the Accommodation Rationale in Bellotti
II. Justice White's participation in Chief Justice Burger's Matheson opinion
is suspicious. His dissents in Roe, Danforth, and Bellotti II are more consis-
tent with the Pro-State Rationale that Justice Stevens relied upon in his Matheson
concurrence. Justice Stevens' change from opposition to third party consent
in Bellotti II to support for a blanket notice requirement in Matheson is not
necessarily inconsistent if one is willing to accept his explanation that notice
and consent requirements are fundamentally different. This rough agreement
on a common rationale was, however, firmly opposed by Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall who espoused a Pro-Woman Rationale. As a conse-
quence of this continuing disagreement, Matheson suggested that future con-
flicts would focus on two problems. First, would it be permissible to require
a physician to notify all parents? Second, what impact would a physician notice
requirement have on the confidentiality of a judicial consent alternative? In
this uncertain legal context, two pre-Bellotti II enactments - an Akron, Ohio
ordinance and a Missouri statute - began their journey through the federal
courts. 70
II. AKRON CENTER AND ASHCROFT CASES
A. The Ordinance and the Statute
The ordinance passed by the Akron City Council and the statute enacted
by the Missouri General Assembly regulating a minor's abortion decision-making
shared one common feature: they contained Model III consent provisions."
These laws granted the minor a choice of adult third party participants. If she
did not want to ask her parents' consent, then she could petition a state juvenile
court for an order authorizing a physician to abort her. However, their judicial
alternatives differed in one important respect. The city ordinance stated in
general terms the minor's right to a court-ordered abortion, while the state
statute spelled out the judicial alternative in elaborate detail. In addition, these
laws each contained a notice provision. The Missouri statute included a judicial
notice provision which required formal notice to all parents and the oppor-
tunity for parents to participate in the abortion hearing and appeal. 2 The Akron
Ordinance contained a similarly broad and detailed physician notice provision,
but required its use only if the woman invoked the ordinance's judicial alter-
native and received a court order for an abortion. 3
'"The Akron ordinance was enacted on February 28, 1978 and the Missouri statute on June 29, 1979,
three days before the Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti II.
7'AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES, ch. 1870.05(B) (1975) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
"Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
"Section 1870.05(A) of the Akron ordinance is redundant, if, as under the Ohio juvenile statute (supra
note 72), parental involvement is required in a court proceeding for an abortion.
[Vol. 17:1
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1. Akron Ordinance
Section 1870.05 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Akron, Ohio,
contains the parental notice and consent provisions."4 Subsection (A) imposes
a physician notice provision. It requires a physician to give formal notice to
the parents of a minor under eighteen years of age prior to her abortion if
she invokes the ordinance's judicial alternative in section 1870.05(B)(2)." Sub-
section (B)(1) imposes a written parental consent requirement on a minor under
fifteen. It requires a physician to first obtain the "informed written consent
of [the minor's] parents or legal guardian."7 6 However, subsection (B)(2) per-
mits a physician to perform an abortion on a woman under fifteen without
parental consent if "[tihe minor pregnant woman first ... [has] obtained an
order from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be perform-
ed or induced."" The judicial alternative to which the ordinance refers is a
proceeding in a state juvenile court. The state juvenile statute gives no par-
ticular attention to the minor's pregnant status, but treats her petition as a case
of parental negligence and mandates that her parents be notified and given
the right to participate in a hearing where the judge will have the discretion
to determine the minor's best interests. 8
2. Missouri Statute
Section 188.028 of the Missouri Statutes contains the parental notice and
consent provisions. 9 Section 188.028.1 imposes a parental consent requirement
on a woman under eighteen unless she is emancipated or has invoked the statute's
judicial alternative and received a court order permitting her to have an
abortion. "
Section 188.028.2 provides an extremely detailed alternative judicial pro-
cedure. It permits a minor to request two orders from a court: a self-consent
order because the court grants her majority rights or a court consent order
because the court finds that the abortion is in her best interests."8 To receive
either order, subsection (1) specifies who may file the petition and what allega-
"AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES, ch. 1870.05 (1975).
"Section 1870.05(A) states: "No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon an unmarried pregnant
woman under the age of 18 years without first having given at least twenty-four (24) hours actual notice
to one of the parents or legal guardian... or if such parent or guardian cannot be reached after a reasonable
effort to find him or her, without first having given at least seventy-two (72) hours constructive notice
to one of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor pregnant woman by certified mail to the last
known address of one of the parents or guardian ... unless the abortion is ordered by a court having
jurisdiction over such a minor pregnant woman.
"Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
"7Id.
"Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
"Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
"Id.
"Id.
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tions it must contain.82 Subsection (3) details the character of the hearing which
must be held "within five days of the filing of the petition." 3 If the minor
is unable to afford counsel, the court is also required to appoint counsel "at
least twenty-four hours before the time of the hearing." '8 4 At the hearing, to
be held on the record, "the court shall hear evidence relating to [1] the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor; [2]
the nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to abortion; and [3] any
other evidence the court may find useful .. . ."I' Subsection (4) specifies the
decisions which the court may make. It states that, subject to the general stan-
dard of good cause, the court shall:
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to an abortion; or
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion setting forth the grounds for so
finding; or
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied.8 6
Subsection (6) sets out the procedures to be followed by the minor seeking an
expedited appeal from a court order.8 7
Section 188.028.2 also contains a blanket notice requirement that grants
parents an extensive right to participate in the judicial proceedings. Subsection
(2) requires that all parents be formally notified when their daughter chooses
the judicial alternative. 8 Additionally, subsections (3) and (6) grant the parents
"Id. Subsection (1) states: "The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile court which
shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition and notices required pursuant to this section.
The minor or next friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth [1] the initials of the
minor; [2] the age of the minor; [3] the names and addresses of each parent, guardian . . . ; [4] that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; [5] that the minor is of
sound mind and has a sufficient intellectual capacity to consent to the abortion; [6] that, if the court does
not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of the abortion, the court should find the abortion
is in the best interests of the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion; [7] that the court should
appoint a guardian ad litem of the child; and [8] if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel; [91 The petition shall be signed by the minor or by the next friend. Id.
"Id.
"Id.
5d.
86Id.
"Id. Subsection (6) states: "An appeal from an order issued under the provisions of this section may
be taken to the court of appeals of this state by the minor or by a parent or guardian of the minor. The
notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from the date of issuance of the order.
The record on appeal shall be completed and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing
of notice of appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance of the abortion, the
supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide for expedited appellate review of cases appealed
under this section." Id.
"Id. Subsection (2) states in part: "Copies of the petition and notice of the date, time, and place of the
hearing shall be personally served upon each parent [or guardian] . . . by the sheriff or his deputy. If
a parent or guardian ... cannot be personally served within two days after reasonable effort, the sheriff
or his deputy shall give constructive notice to them by certified mail to their last known address, and the
hearing shall not be held for at least forty-eight hours from the time of the mailing." Id.
[Vol. 17:1
14
Akron Law eview, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss1/6
hearing and appeal rights and, if they are indigent, the right to a court-appointed
lawyer., 9
B. Judicial Response
The judicial examination of the Akron ordinance and the Missouri statute
raised several basic questions about third party participation. First, would any
judicial alternative be acceptable? Second, if one were acceptable, would any
Model III consent provisions which gave a minor the choice of adult participants
sufficiently protect the minor's privacy right? Having given the minor an op-
tion, could the state impose a notice provision which would require a court
to notify her parents and give them the right to participate before the court
made a decision? Having given the minor a choice, would the character of the
judicial consent procedure make any difference? Would it be sufficient if the
law merely granted the minor the right to obtain an order from a state court,
as the Akron ordinance did? If this brevity provided too much judicial discre-
tion, could the law set-up a vertiable procedural code, as the Missouri statute
did, without imposing an impermissible burden on the minor? Finally, would
any physician notice provision be consistent with the minor's right to choose
the judicial alternative under a Model III consent provision?
1. Federal District and Court of Appeals Decisions
The Akron Center and Ashcroft cases, unlike Bellotti II and Matheson,
involved the first adjudication of comprehensive abortion laws since Danforth.
Therefore, the judicial evaluation of third party notification and consent pro-
visions for minors took place within the context of laws establishing requirements
for informed consent; waiting periods; inspections; hospital, post-viability, and
emergency abortions; disposal of fetal remains; experimentation; reports; and
recordkeeping.9 ° Judicial evaluation also took place within the context of
widespread adoption of these procedural requirements since the Akron ordinance
had become the model for abortion laws in eleven states. 91
a. Akron Center Case
In federal district court, Akron Center challenged the parental notice and
consent provisions of the city ordinance. The court condemned section
1870.05(A)'s blanket physician notice requirement. Relying on Justice Powell's
Bellotti II opinion, the court found the provision to be a significant intrusion
upon the right of mature and "best interests" minors to a confidential judicial
alternative. These minors, the court held, "must be afforded an opportunity
to convince a court . . . that consultation would not be in their own, or in
"Id. Subsection (3) requires a court to appoint counsel for any party unable to afford counsel twenty-
four hours before the hearing and subsection (6) provides that an appeal "may be taken to the court of
appeals of this state by the minor, by a parent, or guardian of the minor." Id.
90103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
9'E. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS AND THE COURTS 137 (1982).
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their parents', best interests." 92 The district court also found that section
1870.05(B)'s Model III consent provisions did not comport with Danforth and
Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti II, because it did not provide a judicial alter-
native to parental consent that allowed a minor to demonstrate in court that
her consent was informed." Therefore, without further discussion the court
held that the ordinance's requirement that all minors receive parental consent
or a court order placed "an impermissible right to veto the informed decision
of a competent minor in her parents or, alternatively, in a court." 9
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the physician notice provisions
of section 1870.05(A) required a different treatment since in the interim the
Supreme Court had decided H.L. v. Matheson. 95 Using the standing doctrine
as the Supreme Court had in Matheson to avoid the broader question of the
notice provision's applicability to all minors, the court of appeals held that
since no minor was questioning the validity of the ordinance, section 1870.05(A),
like the parental notification provision in Matheson, was "a constitutionally
permissible regulation insofar as it applie[d] to immature minors who live with
their parents, are dependent upon them and are not emancipated by marriage
or otherwise." 96 The appellate court then turned briefly to the ordinance's Model
III consent provision and held that the district court had correctly found that
section 1870.05(B) was unconstitutional because it imposed a third party veto.9"
b. Ashcroft Case
Planned Parenthood challenged the validity of the Missouri statue's judicial
consent procedure on several grounds, 9 but the district court limited its atten-
tion to only one issue: whether section 188.028.2(4)'s judicial consent procedure
insufficiently confined a judge's discretion because it permitted a court to deny
a minor access to an abortion even though she was mature enough to make
her own decision. 9 The court declined to abstain under Bellotti land read the
statute disjunctively. 00 It concluded that each of subsection (4)'s three alter-
natives was independent of the others and consequently alternative (c) authorized
a juvenile court "to deny the [minor's] petition . . . for good cause ... but
does not require a prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and
not competent to make a decision regarding abortion independently."' 1
Therefore, the court held that subsection (4)'s decision criteria created an ab-
92479 F. Supp. 1172, 1202 (N.D.Ohio 1979).
"Id. at 1203.
14Id. at 1201.
"1651 F.2d 1198, 1205 (6th Cir. 1981).
16Id. at 1206.
6Id. at 1205.
'483 F. Supp. 679, 688 (W.D.Mo. 1980).
"Id. at 689-90.
10d.
101d. at 689.
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solute veto forbidden by Danforth and Bellotti II. 102
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit examined Planned Parenthood's claim that
section 188.028.2(2)'s requirement of judicial notification of all parents whose
minors invoke the judicial alternative procedure was unconstitutional. The court
stated that H.L. v. Matheson, upheld the physician's responsibility to make
an initial determination about the maturity of a minor. If he concluded that
she was immature and it would be in her best interests, he was required to contact
her parents.II3 Extending Matheson, the court of appeals found subsection (2)
unconstitutional, because it required a blanket notification of all parents ir-
respective of the minor's maturity or what the minor's best interests might
require.I" The court of appeals then proceeded to overturn the district court's
holding that section 188.028.2(4) granted a court "unbridled discretion" to
decide about a minor's abortion. The appellate court found that the statutory
language "would initially require the court to find that the minor was not eman-
cipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abor-
tion was not in her best interests." I5 Read sequentially, the Eighth Circuit held
that the statute's judicial decision criteria were constitutional.' 6
2. Supreme Court Decision
The Akron Center and Ashcroft cases presented only one issue to the
Supreme Court on the subject of a minor's abortion decision-making: whether
a city or state may enact a Model III consent provision which furthers a signifi-
cant governmental interest by providing a minor with a judicial alternative to
parental consent to her abortion. This section will examine the decision sug-
gested by Bellotti H and then analyze the Court's actual decision. In both in-
stances, the analysis will focus on the major criteria involved in Justice Powell's
proposed judicial alternative: individuality, confidentiality, and expeditiousness.
a. The Expected Decision
Bellotti II is the central case for evaluating the constitutionality of the Akron
and Missouri consent provisions. In Bellotti 11 the Court, except for Justice
White, condemned the Massachussetts Model II consent provisions, but justified
that decision with two different rationales set out in the opinions of Justices
Powell and Stevens. Since then, Justice Powell's proposed notice and consent
provisions have set the standard for the analysis in federal courts. At the same
time, Justice Stewart's resignation has diminished the Powell plurality to three
and Justice O'Connor's appointment has added a relatively unknown variable
to the difficulty of predicting judicial behavior. Nevertheless, this section will
"'Id. at 690.
03655 F.2d 848, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1981).
1
0 Id. at 859.
10Id. at 858.
1061d
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ask: What outcomes does Bellotti II suggest for the Akron Center and Ashcroft
cases? 107
The Akron ordinance provisions are unlikely to survive Supreme Court
scrutiny. The Stevens and Powell pluralities will form a seven person majority
to strike them down although agreement on a rationale will be difficult. The
Stevens plurality, relying on a Pro-Woman Rationale, will object to the
ordinance's judicial alternative, because it provides an unacceptable third par-
ty burden on a minor's abortion decision. The Powell plurality, turning to its
Accommodation Rationale, will argue that the ordinance is unconstitutional
because the state juvenile court alternative it provides will permit a judge to
exercise unrestrained discretion to make a "best interests" judgment about all
minors; it requires a blanket notification of and consultation with all parents
irrespective of the minor's confidentiality interests; and it unduly burdens a
minor's abortion decision because it fails to provide for an expedited hearing
and appeal. Justice White will probably dissent. His support for third party
involvement is clear from his Pro-State dissents in Danforth and Bellotti II
and from his participation in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Matheson.
The Missouri statute will meet an uncertain fate. The justices will not be
able to examine the confidentiality of the judicial alternative because the state
did not appeal the statute's judicial notice provision found unconstitutional
by the Eighth Circuit. ' The justices will, however, be able to examine the
statute's individuality and promptness criteria. These will succumb to the Stevens
plurality's oposition to third party participation. The Powell plurality will,
however, sustain the evidentiary requirements of section 188.028.2 (3) and
uphold the Eighth Circuit's sequential reading of subsection (4), because these
provisions for mature and "best interests" minors will sufficiently confine
judicial discretion.'° 9 The Powell plurality will also sustain the procedural criteria
of subsections (3) and (6) because their assurance of an expeditious hearing
and appeal will minimize the possibility that the judicial alternative will become
a tedious and burdensome experience for minors. l I If this alignment occurs,
the votes of Justices White and O'Connor will be crucial. Justice White, given
his support for third party involvement, may be persuaded to join in an opinion
written by either Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist, or Chief Justice Burger,
but they will need the support of Justice O'Connor for an authoritative state-
ment on a judicial alternative.
b. The Actual Decision
The Supreme Court's opinions in the Akron Center and Ashcroft cases,
"'°This question assumes that the Court will reach the merits in these two cases and not deny standing
or abstain as they have been requested.
"'Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Section 188.028.2(2) was held unconstitutional by the
Eighth Circuit. See 655 F.2d at 858-60.
"'OMo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(3),(4).
"'Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(3),(6).
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handed down at the end of its 1982 Term, reaffirmed a woman's constitutional
right to obtain an abortion and struck down many procedural requirements
regarding access to abortion.' The Court's decisions are particularly impor-
tant because they produced agreement among a majority of the justices for
the first time on a third party consent requirement for minors.
In Akron Center Jusice Powell, speaking for six members of the Court," 2
dismissed the City's abstention argument I3 over Justice O'Connor's dissent." 4
Then he went on to uphold the Sixth Circuit's finding that section 1870.05(B)
of the Codified Ordinances of Akron violated the "relevant legal standards"
used in Danforth and Bellotti Il. The Akron ordinance did not expressly create
a judicial alternative based on Justice Powell's Bellotti II opinion, because it
required the minor to resort to a state juvenile court where she was not per-
mitted to "demonstrate that she ...[was] sufficiently mature to make the
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity an abortion would
be in her best interests.""II5 Consequently, Justice Powell found that the or-
dinance violated his Model III consent provisions, because it had made an im-
permissible "blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too
immature to make this decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor's
best interests without parental approval."" 6
Justice Powell also announced the judgment for the Court in Ashcroft,
upholding the Missouri statute's judicial alternative in section 188.028.2,"7
however only the Chief Justice joined in his opinion based on the Accommo-
dation Rationale. Justice Powell found that section 188.028.2 complied with
the standards of his Bellotti II opinion: individuality, confidentiality, and ex-
pedition. Confidentiality was assured, he said, by subsection (1)'s requirement
that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition'1 8 and expedition was
assured by subsection (6)'s provision for a speedy appeal." 9 Justice Powell's
major concern, however, was with the statute's individuality criteria. Did sub-
section (4) permit a court to disregard the interests of mature and "best interests"
minors? He rejected Planned Parenthood's argument that the Court should
abstain because of the ambiguity of subsection (4) as evidenced by the different
interpretations placed upon it by the district court and the Eighth Circuit.,20
Then he turned to the merits which he examined as an issue of statutory con-
'103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
"'The Powell majority included Chief Justice Berger and Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
1'103 S. Ct. at 2497-99.
"'Id. at 2513-14.
11Id. at 2498.
116id.
1'103 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
1"'Id. at 2525 n.16.
ItId.
I"Id. at 2526.
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struction: whether or not subsection (4) provided "an alternative procedure
whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to
make the abortion decision herself or that despite her immaturity an abortion
would be in her best interests.'" I2 Justice Powell acknowledged that subsection
(4) on its face authorized a judge to choose among its three alternatives, but
once again he approved the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, saying "[tihe Court
of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition 'for good
cause' unless it first found ... that the minor was not mature enough to make
her own decision. "22 So construed, Justice Powell found that subsection (4)'s
judicial alternative decision criteria were consistent with "established legal
standards."' 23 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist in
a brief concurrence, agreed that subsection (4)'s judicial consent provision was
constitutional because "it imposes no undue burden on any right that a minor
may have to undergo an abortion.'' 12 4
Justice Blackmun's dissent, which was joined in part by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, emphasized that in Bellotti II they had concluded that
"any judicial consent statute would suffer from the same flaw that the Court
identified in Dan forth: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient.", 25 On the basis of this Pro-Woman
Rationale, Justice Blackmun found section 188.028.2 unconstitutional.'26
c. Comparisons
Bellotti H proved fairly accurate in suggesting the outlines of these deci-
sions. In Akron Center both pluralities, Justice Rehnquist excepted,' 7 con-
demned the ordinance while Justice White dissented. In Ashcroft, Justices White
and O'Connor's support was crucial to the 5-4 outcome in which the Stevens
plurality dissented. Bellotti H was also helpful in focusing attention on one
major development: Justice Powell's opinions and the behavior of the Stevens
plurality. In his Akron Center opinion, Justice Powell asserted that "relevant
legal standards" were not in dispute. 28 Danforth would not permit a blanket
consent provision, although a majority in Bellotti H - the Powell plurality
and Justice White in his dissent - would support a consent alternative. '29 Then
Justice Powell even more boldly asserted that Bellotti H supported the conclu-
sion that this consent alternative must be tailored to the interests of mature
12 1d. at 2525.
221Id. at 2526.
.
2 Id. at 2525.
11'Id. at 2532.
"'Id. at 2531.
"'Id. at 2532.
"'Justices White and Rehnquist joined in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion.
"11103 S. Ct. at 2497.
1291d.
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and "best interests" minors. What is extraordinary is that this argument goes
unanswered in Akron Center. The Stevens plurality should have concurred
arguing that the Akron ordinance violated the Roe bilateral model.' 30 Justice
Powell's opinion should also have prompted Justices Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, or Blackmun to state in their concurrence that Justice Powell had
impermissibly rewritten Bellotti II. Instead they joined in Justice Powell's
majority opinion. This behavior, by itself, may have indicated a substantial
shift from their commitment to a Pro-Woman Rationale, but this possibility
was dispelled by their subsequent behavior in Ashcroft. When Justice Powell
upheld section 188.028.2(4)'s individuality criteria because it was consistent with
"relevant legal standards" approved in Akron Center, Justice Blackmun
responded: "Until today, the Court has never upheld 'a requirement of a con-
sent substitute, either parental or judicial' ...,,I3 He then went on to argue
that Justice Powell's reading of Bellotti II was expansive and misleading because
it did not support a consent requirement and its individuality criteria were merely
the product of the Powell plurality's advisory opinion.13 2
In sum, a majority of the Court in Akron Center agreed that states could
require third party participation based on a Model III provision which pro-
tected mature and "best interests" minors. In Ashcroft the Court then went
on to approve a statute that complied with that individuality criteria. Thus Akron
Center and Ashcroft were a first step in fashioning a third party model for
a minor's abortion decision-making based on the Accommodation Rationale
as elaborated by Justice Powell in his Bellotti II opinion.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
This article has examined the issue of third party participation in a minor's
abortion decision. It has argued that the Supreme Court's decisions are based
on three rationales. These rationales - Pro-Woman, Pro-State, and Accommo-
dation - have explained how agreement on the modification of the Roe bilateral
model originated, what direction it has taken, and at whose initiative.
The three rationales appeared in Danforth where the Court first confronted
the issue of third party participation. The Pro-Woman and Pro-State Rationales
set the boundaries for debate. Within those boundaries, Justice Stewart in his
concurrence joined by Justice Powell suggested the Accommodation Rationale.
Then in Bellotti II, Justice Powell took the initiative by formulating a syn-
thesis. This was the decisive act in the entire debate over third party participa-
tion. Since then, Justice Powell's proposed consent and notice provisions have
established a standard for the evaluation of state legislation in the lower federal
courts and set the agenda for debate by the Supreme Court.'33 In Matheson,
3OId.
"11103 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting Justice Powell, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2519 (1983)).
"Id. at 2531.
'"Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti H was followed in every major federal court case involving parental
consent and notice provisions. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1981); Planned
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Justice Powell acknowledged in a concurrence that a limited physician notice
provision was consistent with his Bellotti II opinion. Then in Akron Center,
Justice Powell once again took the initiative. This time he engaged in an im-
aginative recreation of Bellotti II when he declared that it supported third party
participation, but that any regulation of a minor's abortion decision-making
must provide an exception for mature minors. Then in Ashcroft, he found that
the statute's judicial alternative complied with the "established legal standard"
announced in Akron Center.
What is the current situation? The Roe bilateral model has been modified
in two respects. First, states may require third party consent on the basis of
a Model III consent provision. Such a provision must give the minor a choice
of consent by either her parents or a court. If she chooses the judicial alter-
native, the judge's discretion is limited by the criteria of individuality: his decision
must take into consideration the maturity and best interests of the minor.
Second, a state may impose a requirement that a physician notify, if possible,
the parents of an immature, dependent minor.
What cities and states may do to provide for third party participation is
still not entirely clear. If a Model III consent statute is to be based on Justice
Powell's criteria of individuality, confidentiality, and expeditiousness, then the
Supreme Court has only partially completed its task. The Missouri statute may
well serve as a model for compliance with the individuality criteria and thereby
assure that mature and best interests minors will be protected from an abuse
of judicial discretion. Yet Model III consent statutes will continue to be the
subject of future Supreme Court litigation because the justices have not given
any meaningful attention to the confidentiality and expeditiousness criteria of
the judicial alternative.
Expeditiousness is necessary to assure that the minor's use of the judicial
process - the filing of the petition, the hearing, and any appeals - will occur
with the minimum necessary delay and impose the minimum necessary burden
on the exercise of her constitutional right. Speed and simplicity are central to
any Model III judicial alternative. The Missouri statute examined in Ashcroft
provided for some of those expeditiousness needs. Section 188.028.2(3) states
that the hearing will occur within five days of the filing of the petition and
a court-appointed attorney will be provided twenty-four hours prior to the
hearing.' 34 Section 188.028.2(6) also states that notice of appeal must be pro-
vided within twenty-four hours after the hearing and perfected within five days
from the issuance of the court order. 35 This section then directs the state supreme
court to provide by court rule for expedited appeals. 3 6 In Ashcroft, Justice
Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009-11 (1st Cir. 1981); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340,
1344 (D.N.D. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 203-05 (E.D.La. 1980); and Women's
Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 547 (D.Me. 1979).
11'Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
"'Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(6) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
13Id.
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Powell gave limited attention to these expeditiousness features of the statute.
In a footnote, he approved of subsection (6) because, he said, it provided "the
framework for a constituionally sufficient means of expediting judicial
proceedings."'
37
Justice Powell's cursory examination of the Missouri statute means that
in the future the Court will probably have to give serious attention to what
a statute must contain to be sufficiently expeditious. When it does, it may
be able to examine time limits similar to those in the Missouri law and rules
promulgated by a state supreme court. The Court may also be able to ex-
amine provisions not contained in the Missouri law. These include requirements
governing the filing of the petition - the use of a standardized form and
the payment of a filing fee - and time limits for a trial court's decision and
appellate review.
How is the expeditiousness criteria likely to be articulated by the Supreme
Court? Ad hoc examination of state statutes containing judicial alternatives
could prove to be tedious and provide only fragmented guidance. If Justice
Powell continues to influence the shape of the judicial alternative, he may
once again be able to engage in policy leadership as he did in Bellotti II and
Akron Center. If so, he may be able to further define what Model III con-
sent provisions must contain to assure that the judicial alternative will be suf-
ficiently speedy and simple so that it will not burden the minor's constitu-
tionally protected right.
Confidentiality is central to any meaningful judicial alternative. The alter-
native must assure that the minor's legal action will remain anonymous in
two respects. First, it must assure that no one will be able to uncover her identity
from legal records. So far the Court has given only passing attention to this
aspect of confidentiality. In Ashcroft, Justice Powell believed that confiden-
tiality was assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition.'3 The Missouri statute also required that the minor's
petition contain her age and the names and addresses of her parents, but Justice
Powell said nothing about this information.'39 Disclosure of her age would
appear to be unobjectionable, but information about her parents would deprive
her of legal confidentiality. Second, confidentiality must assure the minor that
her use of the judicial process will remain unknown to her parents. The Court
examined this aspect of confidentiality in Bellotti II where it forbade the use
of a blanket judicial notice provision, and in Matheson where it permitted
a limited physician notice requirement. The Court has not, however, explored
the relationship between the judicial consent alternative approved in Akron
Center and these two forms of notice. The Court has not addressed the general
111103 S. Ct. at 2525 n.16.
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question: What notice, if any, must be given to parents whose minor child
invokes the judicial process? When the Court does examine this question, it
will have to consider two subsidiary question: (1) What notice, if any, must
the courts provide parents before they decide on the minor's petition? and
(2) Once the minor has a court order, what notice, if any, must physicians
provide parents before they perform the abortion?
How are these questions likely to be answered in future cases? If Justice
Powell continues to influence the shape of the judicial alternative, it is likely
that he may again take the initiative, as he did in Bellotti II and Akron Center,
to define the scope and depth of a permissible judicial notice provision. If he
does, he may argue that the individuality criteria that received majority sup-
port in Akron Center are meaningless for mature and "best interest" minors
without an assurance of confidentiality. He may go on to argue that Bellotti
II will not permit notice to any parent whose child has filed a petition for a
court-ordered abortion. Parental notice will occur, if at all, only after a court
makes a judgment about the minor's status. If the minor convinces a court
of her maturity, then consultation would not be permitted. If, however, a court
denies her request for majority rights or rejects her claim of maturity, then
Bellotti II would grant a court discretion to determine whether parental notice
and consultation would be in the best interests of an immature minor.
Once the minor has a court order, the scope and depth of physician notice
provisions are relevant to the confidentiality a minor has sought from her election
of a judicial consent alternative. It is unlikely that the physician notice provi-
sions will be expanded to include mature minors or to permit parental con-
sultation with all minors before the physician performs the abortion. Blanket
physician notice provisions would be inconsistent with blanket judicial notice
provisions condemned in Bellotti II, unlikely to gain majority support from
a court committed to a narrow reading of Matheson, and arguably intrusive
of the right Akron Center and Ashcroft granted to mature minors. Even if
Matheson remains unaltered, it may create a problem for the Court. If the
Court does limit judicial notice statutes as described above, then an immature
minor who is granted a court-ordered abortion without parental consultation
may have the confidentiality of her decision intruded upon by a statute that
requires a physician to notify the parents of immature dependent minors. One
possible escape from this dilemma would be a requirement that court orders
include a prohibition of physician notice in cases of immature and dependent
minors whose bests interests a judge has decided would not be served by parental
awareness.
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